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Whether they know it or not, students, practitioners and teachers
of law have been and continue to be influenced in their work by the
work of Harold D. Lasswell. Like a lawyer's lawyer, he has for more
than three decades been the legal scholar's scholar. He has jarred the
cakes of custom in legal education and given us an agenda for study
designed to clarify the goals and alternatives implicit in the process
and substance of decisionmaking in law. He has made the law-trained
person conscious of what now seems obvious, i.e., that law (including
its administration) forms an integral part of the social system; that it
is a decision process for formulating and implementing policy con-
cerned with the regulation of coercive force to accord with preferred
values; that it encompasses a complex continuum of decisions between
and within levels of authority for local, state, regional, national and in-
ternational communities; and that the study and appraisal of law re-
quire identifying and clarifying both the multiple functions of each de-
cisionmaker and the values and consequences at issue in each decision.'
Emphasizing a contextual and policy-oriented approach to the study
of the decision process, Lasswell sought something more discriminating
in terms of function than the traditional "legislative., executive and ju-
dicial." With regard to decisions in each of these divisions, he asked
seven questions which refer to what now may be perceived as seven
traditional functions: "How is the information [intelligence] which
comes to the attention of decision makers gathered and processed? How
are recommendations made and promoted? How are general rules pre-
scribed? How are general rules provisionally invoked in reference to
conduct? How are general rules applied? How is the working of pre-
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scriptions appraised? How are the prescriptions and arrangements en-
tered into within the framework of such rules brought to termina-
tion?"
2
Though providing a framework and a rationale for the functional
analysis of law in any social system, Lasswell, as political scientist and
private scholar, does not pretend that his is a value-neutral or value-
free profession. Rightly called "policy scientist for a democratic so-
ciety," he has always sought to promote and to make feasible the wide-
spread sharing of (or at least access to) power, enlightenment, wealth,
well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude.3 For him and for
Myres S. McDougal, his distinguished and frequent collaborator, the
broadest distribution of these eight human needs is the work of law
and critical to the meaning and viability of a democratic system.4
Lasswell's work affirms the notions that freedom must be "the over-
2. H. LASSWELL, THE DECISION PROCESS: SEVEN CATEGORIES OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 2
(1956) (emphasis added). "Although it is usually possible to point to agencies that
specialize in a given function, all agencies perform all functions to some extent." Id. at 3.
3. Easton, Harold Lasswell: Policy Scientist For A Democratic Society, 12 J. POL. 450
(1950); Smith, The Mystifying Intellectual History of Harold D. Lasswell, in POLITICS,
PERSONALITY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 90 (A. Rogow ed. 1969).
In his acceptance of the Uniform Declaration of Human Rights, Lasswell applies
the eight key values which hallmark his analytic design:
1. Power. The Declaration asserts the right "to take part in the government," "to be
recognized as a person before the law," and "to effective remedy by competent na-
tional tribunals." Criteria of fair trial are enumerated together with a right of
asylum. There is a right to "a social and international order."
2. Enlightenment. There is "freedom of opinion and expression" and a right "to seek.
receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers."
3. Wealth. Recognition is given to the "right to own property" and to a "standard
of living adequate for the well-being" of the individual and his family.
4. Well-being. The Declaration recognizes the right to "life, liberty and security of
person" and condemns "torture" as well as "cruel" or "inhuman" treatment or
punishment. There is a "right to rest and leisure" and a general right to "social
security."
5. Skill. Recognized is the "right to work, to free choice of employment," and "to
protection against unemployment." Also "everyone has a right to education" and "to
participate freely in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to
share in scientific achievement and its benefits."
6. Affection. The Declaration specifies the "right to marry and to found a family"
and to engage in congenial association with others ("peaceful assembly and associa-
tion"). And there is the right to be identified with a national community ("right to
a nationality").
7. Respect. The first article affirms that "all human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and right.... Everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms ... without
distinction of any kind." Obviously, there must be no "slavery or servitude," no
arbitrary interference with "privacy, family, home or correspondence," and freedom
from attacks on "honor and reputation."
8. Rectitude affirms "freedom of thought, conscience and religion.... Everyone has
duties to the community," and there is no right to destroy the freedom of others.
H. LASSWELL, I. McHALE & B. PIEGEL, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 3, 4 (1974).
Thus democracy may be defined in his terms as a social system in which every one of
the specified values are widely shared among all persons within the system and despotism
as a social system in which the distribution of values is not widely shared, i.e., is
decidedly inequitable. Smith, supra note 3, at 80.
4. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training In
The Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
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riding goal of policy in our body politic" and that respect for human
dignity must be the ultimate concern.5
Out of a shared concern for assuring that the administration of
law serve human dignity, this essay will make a tentative appraisal of
three apparently disparate legal processes designed to protect each
adult's entitlement to make decisions for himself or herself free of
coercion or deception by public or private, but state licensed, au-
thority. It will focus on (a) entrapment into criminal conduct, (b)
informed consent to medical therapy or experimentation and (c) bar-
gaining for a guilty plea.
What do these processes have in common? Each involves state super-
vision of persons who have been entrusted by the state in the interests
of public order to use coercive force or who, because of their special
skills, training and status, may be overbearing in their relationships
with generally less powerful, often highly vulnerable, persons. Each
involves provisions for preventing abuse of that assigned or attributed
power: in the policeman's relationship with the unsuspecting suspect
whom he seeks to catch "red-handed"; in the doctor-scientist's relation-
ship with the patient who requires therapy or with the experimental
subject who may or may not be a patient and who may or may not
be subject to institutional restraints; and finally, in the prosecutor's,
judge's and defense counsel's relationships with the accused who must
decide what to plead. To oversimplify, the rules for regulating these
transactions between the authorities and the citizen provide that en-
trapment by the police seeking a suspect's decision to commit a crime
is not established if the offender originated the idea to commit the
crime charged; that before treatment or experiment may be under-
taken, the doctor-scientist must obtain an informed decision of pa-
tient or subject; and that a plea bargain is valid if the accused's de-
cision to plead guilty is knowingly and intelligently made.
These rules are rooted in a basic commitment of the legal system
to respect human dignity by protecting the right of every adult to
determine what he shall do and what may be done to him. They have
been designed to assure that citizens (the suspect, the patient or ex-
perimental subject, and the accused) remain free to make their re-
spective critical choices without coercion or deception by the authori-
ties (police officers, doctor-scientists, prosecutors, judges and defense
attorneys). Yet these rules often disserve their, common purpose. They
mistakenly direct the attention of supervising decisionmakers away
5. Lasswell, supra note 1.
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from the conduct of the authorities and to the actual state of mind-
the understanding, knowledge, intent and motivation-of the "con-
senting" citizen. To assign to supervising courts and executive agen-
cies the function of determining whether, for example, an individual
citizen's consent is informed or intelligently made is to attribute to
such decisionmakers a capability they do not have. More importantly,
in fulfilling that assignment, these agents of decision arrogate to them-
selves and to the authorities who are to be supervised that which
deference to human dignity dictates is to remain with the adult
citizen. They act to undercut, rather than to reinforce, respect for
the individual's competence and right to determine for himself what
he needs to know (including that he does not want to know anything)
in order to choose what he thinks is best for himself.6
The law must establish standards of conduct for the authorities,
not for the citizens, in these transactions. The rules should force su-
pervising agents to focus (primarily, if not exclusively) on the ap-
propriateness of the authorities' conduct in communicating with the
citizens concerned and in manipulating the settings in which decisions
to consent are obtained. The priority of attention for inquiry would
thereby be shifted from more subjective to more objective concerns,
from the consenting citizen's state of knowledge and understanding
to the conduct of the authorities in the process of informing the citi-
zen for decision. Whether the citizen actually gave or denied consent
would not be relevant to the inquiry. What would be critical to a
finding that the state's commitment to human dignity was served or
disserved would be the authority's conduct in light of the more ob-
jective standards set.
In order to clarify these assertions and their implications for new
rules, this analysis begins with the least structured and visible trans-
action, entrapping the suspect, and closes with the most structured
and visible one, bargaining with the accused for a guilty plea. The
analysis is single-focused. It does not address, as Lasswell might, ques-
tions concerned with how adequately the processes of entrapping, treat-
ing-experimenting, and bargaining serve societal goals. Nor does it at-
tempt to explore the capacity of authorities to govern their own con-
duct. Instead, the processes are unquestioned and taken out of context.
Thus this article will provide but a partial appraisal and will limit
its recommendations to some guides for clarifying what deference to
6. "To respect anyone is to protect his choosing function so long as its exercise does
not seriously imperil the corresponding freedom of others." McDougal & Lasswell, The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 24
(1959).
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the human dignity of the citizen would mean and what it might re-
quire of the authorities in each of these transactions. 7
I
Entrapment is generally categorized as a defense for the citizen
rather than as an offense by the authority. Such a conceptualization
may account for the prevailing, but mistaken, notion advanced by
the Supreme Court in Sherman v. United States that "to determine
whether entrapment has been established a line must be drawn be-
tween the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal." In making crucial a distinction between the citizen who
is presumed innocent and the citizen who is presumed criminal, the
Court loses sight of the primary purpose of the entrapment doctrine:
to control the conduct of the authorities and to hold them to a standard
of fairness in relation to all persons. The offense of entrapment takes
place once the police or those acting on their behalf fail to observe
the standard set, whether or not they succeed in provoking the citizen
to choose to commit a crime. It might even be argued that the Court,
in terms of its own reasoning, should find unsuccessful police efforts
to importune the strong and unwilling more offensive than successful
efforts to importune the weak and more easily tempted citizen into
crime.
In Sherman, Kalchinian, a government informer plying his trade in
the waiting room of a doctor treating patients for narcotic addiction,
sought to convince the patient Sherman to obtain narcotics for him.
Kalchinian claimed that he was suffering and that his treatment was
not working, and he apparently persuaded Sherman, after many re-
fused requests, to provide him with narcotics.0 At the jury trial "the
factual issue was whether the informer had convinced an otherwise
unwilling person to commit a criminal act or whether petitioner was
already predisposed to commit the act and exhibited only the natural
hesitancy of one acquainted with the narcotic's trade."' 0 The question
was the one often posed by entrapment statutes: who induced whom
7. However, entrapment is examined primarily to demonstrate the need for a rule
shift in overscer focus from citizen to authority and not to detail what might constitute
appropriate police conduct.
8. 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
9. "The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is designed to
overcome. The government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not
only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning to the habit of use.... Thus
the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into
committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforcement does
not require methods such as this." Id. at 376.
10. Id. at 371.
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to commit the crime; with whom did the criminal design originate?
Relying on Sorrells v. United States, Chief Justice Warren concluded
that Sherman had been entrapped. He observed for the Court that
"entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was 'the product
of the creative activity' of law enforcement officials"" and that "[t]hen
stealth and strategy become as objectionable police methods as the
coerced confession and the unlawful search." 12
But the Court refused to reassess the doctrine of entrapment. It
failed to allow its confession and search analogies to lead it to under-
stand that the question of the guilt or innocence of an accused is
separate from the question of the appropriateness or the offensiveness
of the police conduct. Thus the Court, understandably but mistakenly,
abrogated the trial court's supervisory function by transferring it to
the jury. Of course, in doing so it obscured for the jury the real issue
of standards for police conduct by asking it to focus on the accused's
"'predisposition' as bearing on his claim of innocence."' 3
Like the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained by the authori-
ties, the defense of entrapment should not hinge on the proneness to-
ward crime, or for that matter on actual guilt or innocence, of the
defendant if it is to serve even indirectly as a judicial device for su-
pervising the police.' 4 Had the defendant been importuned by some-
one other than an agent of the state, his conviction, and for that matter,
the conviction of his accomplice, would not be challenged. In setting
standards for police conduct in defining the crime of entrapment-
a task beyond the scope of this article-what must be clarified is the
need to redress the unfairness which results from the present expec-
tation of the police that they are immune from criminal sanctions for
conduct that would be criminal for the private citizen. Under such
standards, the police practice of driving in unmarked cars to trap
speedy motorists would be perceived differently from the police prac-
11. Id. at 372, citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441, 451 (1932). For a
codification of this position, see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.40 (McKinney 1967); see
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 427 (1973) (reaffirming Chief Justice Warren's
theory of entrapment in Sherman by reversing the court of appeals because it "in effect
expanded the traditional notion of entrapment, which focuses on the predisposition of
the defendant, to mandate dismissal of a criminal prosecution whenever the court
determines that there has been 'an intolerable degree of governmental participation in
the criminal enterprise.' ").
12. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
13. Id. at 373, citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
14. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). With-
out addressing the question of the appropriateness of using the exclusionary rule to
police the police, it should be noted that it ought not to be the exclusive device for
serving that goal. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 129 (1954).
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tice of driving so disguised at unlawful speeds to entice the citizen
to ignore the speed limit.
Relying in part on an article by Professor Richard C. Donnelly,
whose work was greatly influenced by his colleague and occasional col-
laborator Lasswell, Justice Frankfurter concurred with the result in
Sherman, but disagreed with the Court's reasoning. He more nearly
forced focus where it belongs in recommending a new doctrine to be
applied to entrapment transactions. The following excerpt from the
Frankfurter opinion should be read not only with such transactions
in mind, but in terms of its implications for analyzing the problem
of supervising doctors and scientists seeking to obtain consent from
a patient or the subject of an experiment:
The lower courts have continued gropingly to express the feeling
of outrage at conduct of law enforcers that brought recognition
of the defense in the first instance, but without the formulated
basis in reason that it is the first duty of courts to construct for
justifying and guiding emotion and instinct. . . . [The Court]
should not forego re-examination to achieve clarity of thought,
because confused and inadequate analysis is too apt gradually to
lead to a course of decisions that diverges from the true ends to
be pursued.
0
The crucial question . . . is whether the police conduct . . .
falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for
the proper use of governmental power. For answer, it is wholly
irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to commit the crime originated
with the defendant or government officers .. . . A test that
looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant rather
than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying
reason for the defense of entrapment. . . . Appeals to sympathy,
friendship, the possibility of exorbitant gain, and so forth, can
no more be tolerated when directed against a past offender than
against an ordinary law-abiding citizen. A contrary view runs afoul
of fundamental principles of equality under law, and would es-
pouse the notion that when dealing with the criminal classes
anything goes ...
This does not mean that the police may not act so as to detect
those engaged in criminal conduct and ready and willing to com-
mit further crimes should the occasion. arise. Such indeed is their
obligation. It does mean that in holding out inducements they
should act in such a manner as is likely to induce to the com-
mission of crime only these persons and not others who would
normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary
temptations. This test shifts attention from the record and pre-
disposition of the particular defendant to the conduct of the police
689
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and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would entrap
only those ready and willing to commit crime .... The power of
government is abused and directed to an end for which it was
not constituted when employed to promote rather than detect
crime and to bring about the downfall of those who, left to them-
selves, might well have obeyed the law. Human nature is weak
enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without government
adding to them and generating crime.15
Toward its close, Frankfurter's opinion tends to blur the focus on
the conduct of authorities by apparently restoring some relevance to
making a distinction, however indistinct, between criminally and non-
criminally prone citizens. 16 He thus reintroduces the very element
which formed the basis of his challenge to the majority of the Court.
This intellectual error would be avoided if entrapment were perceived
as an independent crime. Nonoffending citizens could then invoke
prosecutions for entrapment against importuning authorities and their
agents provocateurs. Moreover, prosecution of authorities would ordi-
narily follow a successful defense of entrapment by an "offending"
citizen.17
The blurring of focus in the Frankfurter opinion must not be used
to obscure what it initially clarifies, the need to revise the majority's
rule and thus to assess the conduct of the authority, not of the citizen,
if the judicial supervision of law enforcement is to serve human
dignity. That proposition should be applied in formulating rules gov-
erning doctors and scientists, who, unlike the police, are not empow-
ered to use coercive force, but who are licensed by the state because
of their special skills to act with or upon citizens in ways which
would be either tortious or criminal or both, without citizen consent.
II
"Informed consent," not unlike the shorthand "entrapment defense,"
has come to obscure rather than to clarify the goal it was designed
to serve. The concept has been employed to emphasize a patient's
15. 356 U.S. 369, 378, 379, 382, 383-84 (1958) (emphasis added). The Frankfurter posi-
tion has been codified in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962) and in PRoPosED FEDE RL
CRIMINAL CODE § 702 (Final Rep. of the Nat'l Comm'n on Reform of Fed. Crim. Laws
1971).
16. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting):
"Thus, government agents may engage in conduct that is likely, when objectively con-
sidered, to afford a person ready and willing to commit the crime an opportunity to do
so." (Emphasis added).
17. Rather than define a new crime of entrapment, criminal codes might affirma-
tively declare that solicitation, attempts and conspiracy (as well as the more substantive
crimes within a code) are to be invoked, when applicable, against entrapping police
either as accessories or principals.
690
Vol. 84: 683, 1975
Harold Lasswell
or subject's actual state of mind, knowledge, or understanding in
giving (not denying) consent, rather than to emphasize and force
attention on the conduct required of the therapist or experimenter
in the process of informing the citizen for decision. In the name of
respect for human dignity, the current concept has been subtly con-
strued to deny it (a) by granting to the authorities (court, supervisory
administrative agency or licensed professional) rather than to the citi-
zen (patient or subject) the final word in determining what is best
for him, including what he must know-i.e., how "well informed" he
must be-in order to make that decision; and (b) by proceeding as if
an authority's breach of obligation to disclose a known risk "is le-
gally without consequence" if the risk did not materialize during
the treatment.18
Like the crime requirement of the entrapment defense, the ma-
terialized risk requisite demonstrates the extent to which the concept
has departed from its purpose. It does not recognize that a citizen
can be wronged without being "harmed," that his dignity as a human
being has been violated and that an assault has taken place the moment
the deceiving authority commences therapy or the experiment, even
if beneficial. Further, "consent," as opposed to "decision," in the le-
gal concept of informed consent introduces a bias, especially in thera-
peutic transactions, for perceivirg refusals as uninformed. Refusals may
then be used as a justification for challenging the capacity of the citizen
to decide what is best for himself. A finding of incompetence which
deprives him of authority to decide for himself results from a successful
challenge and constitutes the ultimate disregard of his human dignity.
"Consent by proxy," a dangerous legal fiction for the right to impose
one's will on another, may then be obtained to accord not only with
what a citizen in his "right mind" ought to want, but also with what
he ought to want to know if he is to know what he wants.' 9 The
18. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
19. See McCormick, Proxy Consent in the Experimentation Situation, PERSPECTIVES IN
BioLoGY & MED., Autumn 1974, at 2.
This essay does not examine the extent to which the state should, for example,
through its child neglect and abuse laws supervise parents in their decisions to secure
or deny medical care for their children or to make them donors or experimental sub-
jects. Nor does it examine what circumstances, if any, should justify overcoming the
usual presumption that children are incompetent to choose for themselves without
regard to their parents' wishes, whether to accept or reject medical treatment. In
the blood transfusion case discussed at p. 695 infra the court also authorized blood
transfusions for the infant over the objections of both parents. In life and death
situations the state may intervene to assure a child the opportunity to grow to adulthood
to decide ultimately what is best for himself or herself. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp.
368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972), in which the court assumed the role of overseer of
the parents as authorities who might exploit their children and reviewed their decision
to have a healthy twin daughter donate a kidney to her twin sister:
To prohibit the natural parents and the guardians ad litem of the minor children
the right to give their consent under these circumstances, where there is supervision
The Yale Law Journal
authorities thus get their way without risking liability-and avoiding
this risk seems to be a primary concern of those who draft what are
strangely called "informed consent forms" to be signed by patient
and subject.
Though a cumbersome shorthand, using "the process of informing
for decision" in place of "informed consent" would direct attention
to thinking through standards of conduct for authorities who ask a
citizen to waive his possible claims in tort or criminal law by granting
permission for the proposed intervention. It is, after all, a function
of the law of torts and crimes to protect the integrity of each citizen
from unwanted intrusions upon his person and property without due
process. In these transactions intervention may not be tolerated unless
it is wanted-unless consent is given. Minimally, deference for the
citizen as a human being would require authorities (a) to offer to
disclose the purpose, nature, and conceivable risks which the authority
believes would be relevant to a reasonable man's exercise of choice
as well as alternatives to the proposed treatment or experiment, (b)
to honor the wishes of the patient or subject who does not want to
be told of some or of any information the authority must offer to
disclose, and to answer, even with an "I don't know," any questions
the citizen asked, even if the authority thought it was not good for
the patient to know the answer or that it was not relevant to a rea-
sonable person's informed consent, (c) to offer to provide and to facili-
tate an opportunity for an independent consultation, (d) to honor
the wish of a citizen who says to the authority, "I prefer to rely on
your judgment, for you to inform me of whatever you think I should
know, and for you to do whatever you think is best for me," (e) to
honor a citizen's refusal to consent without threatening to use or using
refusal as a basis for asserting his incompetence, and (f) to honor a
citizen's request to withdraw from treatment or experiment. These
communications must, of course, be made by the authorities in a way
by this court and other persons in examining their judgment, would be most unjust,
inequitable and injudicious.... [NIatural parents of a minor should have the right to
give their consent to an isograft kidney transplantation procedure when their motiva-
tion and reasoning are favorably reviewed by a community representation which in-
cludes a court of equity.
Id. at 378. Exceptions have begun to be acknowledged to the presumed incompetence of
children in the form of medical emancipation, especially in late adolescence. See, e.g.,
Ballard v. Anderson, 484 P.2d 1345, 42 A.L.R.3d 1392 (1971) (construing the California
abortion statute to permit minors to obtain therapeutic abortions without parental con-
sent); Melville v. Sabbatino, 313 A.2d 886, 30 Conn. Supp. 320 (Super. Ct. 1973) (construing
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-187 (1963) to permit minors sixteen and over, despite parental
objection, to exercise the rights of voluntary adult patients to demand release from a
mental hospital). For our purposes, then, the child is perceived as an adult in these
legislative and judicial decisions.
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which reflects a full commitment to respect the wishes of the patient
or subject and in language comprehensible to him.
2 0
In Canterbury v. Spence'2 1 Judge Spottswood Robinson acknowl-
edges and cautions against the not uncommon uncritical use of the
"informed consent" label. The suit involved personal injuries result-
ing from an operation performed by a surgeon who allegedly failed to
disclose to the consenting patient a risk of serious disability. Judge
Robinson comes close to, but falls short of recognizing the full im-
plications of his caution. He, too, ultimately uses the label to undercut
what he calls the "root premise . . . fundamental in American juris-
prudence that '[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body .... 2
In a footnote, he observes:
In duty-to-disclose cases, the focus of attention is more properly
upon the nature and content of the physician's divulgence than
the patient's understanding or consent. Adequate disclosure and
informed consent are, of course, two sides of the same coin-the
former a sine qua non of the latter. But the vital inquiry on duty
to disclose relates to the physician's performance of an obligation,
while one of the difficulties with analysis in terms of informed
consent is its tendency to imply that what is decisive is the de-
gree of the patient's comprehension. The physician discharges the
duty when he makes a reasonable effort to convey sufficient in-
formation although the patient, without fault of the physician,
may not fully grasp it .... Even though the factfinder may have
occasion to draw an inference on the state of the patient's enlight-
enment, the factfinding process on performance of the duty ul-
20. The following doctor's request to place an arterial and central venous silastic
catheter into the coronary sinus for investigatory purposes not directly related to the
patient's illness is in language comprehensible to the patient, but hardly in the spirit
contemplated:
Dr. "We would like to do some special measurements of pressure and blood flow
Pt. "I don't want it. I don't think so. Please don't."
Dr. "Well, I think that it would be very helpful for a couple of reasons. One is that
we think that these measurements would certainly help us to manage people that
have similar problems to yours. We also think that these measurements may be of
help in managing your problem, and we don't feel that this test will harm you at all.
Now it does have dangers, as any test does .... "
Pt. "I don't want it."
Dr. "But we think that the possible benefit to others and to you will outweigh the
dangers involved. Do you have any questions about the test;"
Pt. "No, except that I wish you could talk to my husband if you have the time."
Dr. "Okay-I do-and I'll need your permission for this. Will that be alright?"
Pt. "That's all right with me."
Smith, Myocardial Infarction-Case Studies of Ethics in the Consent Situation, 8 Soc. Sc.
& MED. 399, 401 (1974).
21. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
22. Id. at 780, citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
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timately reaches back to what the physician actually said or failed
to say. And while the factual conclusion on adequacy of the reve-
lation will vary as between patients-the fluctuations are attribut-
able to the kind of divulgence which may be reasonable under the
circumstances.2 3
By not dispensing with the descriptive label "informed" to qualify
"consent," Judge Robinson betrays his commitment to safeguarding
the right of adults of sound mind to determine what shall be done
with their bodies. "True consent to what happens to oneself," he as-
serts, "is the informed exercise of a choice, and entails an opportunity
to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant
upon each."2 4 To the extent emphasis upon choice and an opportunity
means that doctor-scientists must offer to inform and to discuss with
patient-subjects the risks and advantages of alternative courses of ac-
tion, it would comport with the declared jurisprudential goal. To the
extent such emphasis means authorities must divulge such information
to those who do not object to hearing it, it too would comport with
the goal. However, to the extent emphasis is upon consent informed
and knowledgeably given, it would not comport with the goal. Yet that
is where the court's emphasis comes to rest. While asserting that "the
prerogative of the patient is to determine for himself the directions
in which his interests seem to lie," the court, like the "beneficent"
parent who cannot quite accept that his child is now an adult, reas-
serts that after all, it and the physician know best and that "[t]o en-
able the patient to chart his course understandably, some familiarity
with therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes essential.125
Were the court to have kept its focus more directly on the standards
of conduct of those it must supervise, it might have better served the
policy goal by writing: "True decisions by patients and subjects in
such transactions can only be protected to the extent that the authori-
ties, without coercion or deception, facilitate and provide unrestricted
access to as much or as little information as the citizen is willing and
wishes to have." This does not mean that patient-subjects must ask
23. Id. at 780 n.15.
24. Id. at 780.
25. Id. at 781 (emphasis addcd). The court recognizcs a rcasonable limitation on the
physician's duty to disclose in emergcncy situations where communication with the patient
may be impossible (e.g., if the patient is unconscious) and the patient is therefore unable
to make his own decision. Id. at 788-89. But the court's acceptance of a second limitation,
the physician's privilege not to disclose when the latter feels the patient cannot deal
emotionally with the information, betrays its commitment to self-determination and, in
effect, authorizes an ad hoc unilateral finding by the authority of the citizen's incom-
petence. Id. at 789.
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for information before a physician-experimenter is required to offer
to disclose. The burden is always on the authorities to offer to dis-
close (and to disclose and explain unless the citizen objects) at least
that which legislative or judicial standards define as critical to a rea-
sonable person's refusal or consent.
20
To circumscribe the process in this way is to set a standard of con-
duct not for the citizen, but for the authority. The citizen may or
may not take into account that which might be divulged. He may or
may not take into account even information which he requests before
making a decision, whether it is considered relevant or irrelevant to
the "informed" consent or refusal of reasonable people. Thus, the
court's assertion that "the patient's right of self-decision . . . can be
effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information
to enable an intelligent choice" should be tilted slightly to read that
"the patient's right of self-decision is effectively safeguarded if the
authorities provide him with a real opportunity (not with an obliga-
tion) to possess what information he and a reasonable person might
require in order to exercise a choice." To acknowledge that "the pa-
tient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to re-
veal ' 27 requires not that the patient's choice be an intelligent, in-
formed and unemotionally determined decision,28 but that it be the
patient's choice and that the authorities, out of regard for him as a
human being, honor that choice, even if it be for death.
2 9
Just such deference is to be found in an unreported decision by
Judge Tim Murphy for the District of Columbia's Superior Court.
He declined to order a patient facing death to accept blood trans-
fusions which were needed for an emergency hysterectomy to which
she and her husband had consented.30 He declined to use her refusal,
26. Id. at 787.
27. Id. at 786.
28. The American Medical Association's ethical guidelines indicate that "the decision
to donate an organ must be a reasoned, intellectual decision, not an emotional decision,
arrived at entirely voluntarily and free from pressure, and based on full awareness of all
relevant information." Fellner & Marshall, Kidney Donors-The Myth of Informed Con-
sent, 126 AMi. J. PSYCHIATRY 1245, 1250 (1970). But "[n]ot one of the [kidney] donors
[in the study] weighed alternatives and rationally decided. Fourteen of the 20 donors and
nine of the ten donors waiting for surgery stated that they had made their decision im-
mediately when the subject of the kidney transplant was first mentioned over the tele-
phone, 'in a split second,' 'instantaneously,' and 'right away.'" Id. at 1247.
29. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974).
30. In re Pogue (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 12, 1974), in Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1974, at Cl,
col. 1. See Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(refusing to order blood transfusion over patient's objection: "[T]he court concludes that
it is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision who has the final say and
that this must necessarily be so in a system of government which gives the greatest
possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his own desires."). But see Ap-
plication of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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which rested on her belief as a Jehovah's Witness, as a basis for declar-
ing her incompetent to decide for herself. Judge Murphy's decision,
prohibiting the attending doctors from imposing their wishes on the
patient, would fall short of fully serving the stated goal if later deci-
sions were to limit its application to those patients who explain their
choice in terms of a recognized religious belief. Full respect for her
dignity as a person would entitle her to refuse without explanation or
for reasons incomprehensible or unacceptable to the judge or doctors.
To assert this view as a guide to state supervision of authority is
neither to question nor to challenge the following statement by Pope
Pius XII: "[T]he patient [or experimental subject] is not absolute
master of himself, of his body or of his soul. He cannot . . . freely
dispose of himself as he pleases .... He has the right of use; limited
by natural finality, of the faculties and powers of his human nature."
Because he is a user and not a proprietor, he does not have unlimited
power to 'destroy or mutilate his body and its functions. Furthermore,
"the patient cannot confer rights he does not possess . . . [t]he de-
cisive point is the moral licitness of the right a patient has to dispose
of himself. Here is the moral limit to the doctor's action taken with
the consent of the patient."3' What is challenged is that the power
of the state may be employed to impose that moral limit upon citi-
zens who do not share it or that such power be used to push believing
citizens beyond that boundary.32
This single-focus examination of guides to conduct for the authori-
ties in therapeutic and experimental transactions has, up to this point,
assumed an initially voluntary relationship between citizen and au-
thority, i.e., one established free of force by the authorities. But such
transactions often arise in inherently coercive settings, in settings not
unlike those which provoked the Nuremberg declaration of principles
for conducting medical experiments on human beings.33 Involuntary
31. Address by Pope Pius XII, His Holiness, to the First International Congress on
the Histopathology of the Nervous System, Sept. 14, 1952, reprinted in J. GoInsmIN,
A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROcEss 91-92 (174).
32. Though Congress falls into the informed consent error for the citizen in Title II,
"Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research," of the National
Research Service Award Act of 1974 (§§ 202(a)(l)(B)(iv), (a)(2), Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat.
342), it does defer to the human dignity of authority as citizen in his own right by
providing, inter alia, that "[n]o individual shall be required to perform or assist in the
performance of any part of a health service program or research activity... if his per-
formance ... would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions," and that no
institution receiving grants under the Act may "discriminate in the employment promo-
tion or termination of employment" of such persons either because they participated or
refused to participate in such activity. Id. § 214. But see The King v. Bourne, I K.B. 687,
693 (1939).
33. See United States v. Brandt, in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 171 (1947); WORLD MEDICAL Ass'N, THE DECLARATION OF GENEVA
(1949) and THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF ETIIlCS (1949), reprinted in J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 75.
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incarceration of the citizen in a prison or mental hospital is a depri-
vation, albeit with due process, of his human dignity-of his freedom
to choose for himself. Although nothing can fully remove the violation
of personal dignity which attends incarceration (especially if it is
"for one's own good"), it is appropriate even under such circumstances
to continue to focus on setting standards of conduct for offering and
providing information to the inmate in order to safeguard his human
right to be or not be treated, or to be or not to be an experimental
subject. The minimum standards proposed for the free setting would
have equal application for that of incarceration. While the difference
in setting does not require altering the standards for a process of
informing for decision, it does require recognition that the quality
of volition in refusing or consenting, no matter how fully informed,
has been altered. By definition, part of the information implicitly or
explicitly communicated consists, as it does in plea bargaining, of
the coercive reality of the transactional setting.
For purposes of evaluating standards of conduct for the authorities
in relation to such transactions in incarcerative settings, the general
coerciveness of that reality must then be presumed to be information
affecting volition, not the citizen's capacity for making a choice. In
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health,3 4 the inmate
had been offered a choice between experimental surgery with the pos-
sibility of release and continued incarceration. Rather than focusing
on the conduct of the authorities and holding that they must not con-
duct experiments even on consenting inmates, the court focused on
the conduct of the citizen and held that "informed consent cannot be
given by an involuntarily detained mental patient for experimental
psychosurgery .... ." What should have been critical was not whether
the inmate's consent could be informed, but whether the experimental
nature of the proposed surgery coupled with an appropriate fear of
Nuremberg-like abuses might justify prohibiting the authorities from
offering to perform such experiments upon citizens who choose to be
subjects. The court thus fails to confront the issue of why the iu-
carcerated inmate should be denied such choice and, if not, why his
"consent," however limited the choice, should not be honored. It does
not answer why a citizen, if incarcerated for lawful purposes and not
because he refuses medical care or because he refuses to be an ex-
perimental subject, should be denied what choice may be offered. It
does not answer why a person considered, as he was by the court,
34. Civil No. 194-199 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in J. GOLDsEIN, A.
DRSHOWiLZ & R. SCHwARTZ, supra note 31, at 76-81.
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capable to consent to traditional therapy, should be presumed in-
capable or without authority to determine what is best for himself
when the choice is restricted to experimental therapy or continued
incarceration. So far as the process of informing for decision is con-
cerned, why should the standard of conduct for the authorities, even
given the reality of incarceration, be any different from that which
should be imposed upon them in nonincarcerative settings? Professor
Robert Burt, one of the attorneys appointed by the court to represent
the incarcerated person in Kaimowitz, forces that issue into view in
his reflections about that decision:
Why should we [the state] then bar the threat of [continued]
incarceration as an inducement to participate in medical experi-
mentation, including psychosurgery? . . . If we as a society are
willing in any event to impose incarceration on that person, why
does it more transgress his human dignity and inviolability to per-
mit him an option between those alternatives?
It seems tempting to say, "No, that choice is too cruel. Most peo-
ple, if they were really rational, really in possession of their senses,
would not agree to have their brains scrambled in preference to
imprisonment." But if we are most concerned in this matter with
protecting individual autonomy and dignity and if we, as a so-
ciety, are willing to authorize imprisonment for some people and
to authorize experimental psychosurgery for some people, why
would it not best protect John Doe's autonomy and integrity if
we permitted him to choose between these two socially sanctioned
options? 35
The state may decide to prohibit its authorities from offering the
inmate any choice but continued incarceration. But in denying a citi-
zen the option of possibly becoming eligible for release or even of
the possibility of a "better life" in custody by choosing to be an ex-
perimental subject, the authorities further strip the incarcerated citi-
zen of the power to decide what is best for himself. To the extent that
standards of conduct for the authorities are to respect the capacity
and right of the incarcerated citizen to accept or reject treatment or
participation in an experiment, even under such coercive circum-
stances, the ultimate goal of law to respect the dignity of each person
as a human being will be enhanced.
35. Burt, Why We Should Keep Prisoners From Doctors: Reflections on the Detroit
Psychosurgery Case, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1975, at 25, 27 (Feb. 1975); N. MORRIS,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 26 (1974): "It is better directly to confront the potentialities
of abuse of power over prisoners than to rely on the temporary exclusion of prisoners
from 'experimental programs.'"
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III
The plea bargain is the most complicated of the three transactions.
It concerns the conduct not just of a single authority but of three-
prosecutor, trial judge, and defense counsel-in their relationship to
the accused citizen. The accusation which brings the citizen into this
transaction is not unlike the illness which generally brings the citizen
into contact with his physician. The critical difference is, of course,
that the accused is not entitled to choose to ignore the accusation and
thus to avoid establishing contact with the authorities. In short, the
relationships are not voluntary; they result not from the forces of
nature, but from state force.
The test of a valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere is that it be
both voluntary and intelligent.30 Though the requirement that the
plea be made voluntarily has, it seems, forced focus on the conduct
of the authorities, it misleadingly implies that the citizen has a free
choice. However, like the treatment-experiment transactions in insti-
tutions of incarceration, the plea bargain is inherently coercive for the
accused; his ambit of choice is determined by the state. The authori-
ties are empowered either to leave him no choice but to stand trial
or to encourage, if not importune him, to consent to a plea of guilty
rather than press his case to court.
What the Court has come to mean by "voluntary" is, of course,
voluntary under the circumstances: such a plea would be free from
conduct by prosecutor, trial judge or counsel which is "unduly" co-
ercive, that is, conduct engaged in especially for a particular accused,
but the plea would not be free of conduct that was generally coercive,
that is, inhering in the situation in which any accused finds himself.
Thus even if the accused would not plead guilty except for the severity
of the maximum sentence authorized for the crime charged, such a
plea is not invalid as an involuntary act. Like the authorized indefinite
incarceration of John Doe in Kaimowitz, the statutorily authorized
sentence is not something especially dreamed up by the prosecutor to
force the particular accused to plead guilty. It is part of any accused's
reality in the plea bargain setting. For our purposes it is a generally
authorized and thus not unduly coercive threat. However, there would
be undue coercion if, for example, the prosecutor were to bring more
serious charges than those justified by the evidence, to force a guilty
plea to lesser charges. Similarly it would be unduly coercive if the
36. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790 (1970).
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trial judge were to advise an accused that conviction following his
refusal to plead guilty would automatically carry the maximum sen-
tence, whereas a plea would bring only the minimum.
In any event, the requirement of voluntariness, however devalued,
does direct supervisory attention to the conduct of prosecutor, judge,
and counsel and to the establishment of criteria of impermissible
pressure in their effort to induce an accused citizen to plead guilty.
Thus the Court in Brady v. United State 37 declines to hold "that a
guilty plea is compelled ...whenever motivated by the defendant's
desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather
than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to
conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime
charged."38 The Court thereby protects (as it might have done with
regard to John Doe's "consent" to the psychosurgery experiment in
Kaimowitz) the citizen's limited autonomy to decide what is best for
himself under the circumstances. But while the requirement that a
plea be made voluntarily has directed attention toward determining
what authorities may not communicate to the citizen by way of threats,
the requirement that it be made intelligently has failed to direct at-
tention to the need to determine what the authorities must offer and
be willing to communicate during the course of bargaining.
The requirement that a guilty plea be made knowingly and intelli-
gently, like the requirement that a consent to treatment or experiment
be fully informed to be valid, tends mistakenly to focus on the con-
duct and mind of an accused citizen rather than upon the conduct
of the authorities-prosecutor, trial judge, and counsel-in their ef-
forts to obtain his consent to conviction without trial. Not unlike the
patient-subject's waiver of a right to have the physician-scientist held
liable for assault or battery, the accused's consent' is a waiver of his
Sixth Amendment right to trial and of his Fifth Amendment right not
to incriminate himself. The question for supervisory decisionmakers,
whether legislative, judicial or executive, would be: "What informa-
tion must authorities offer and be willing to disclose to the citizen
during negotiations aimed at bargaining away constitutional rights
originally fashioned out of deference for his dignity as a human being
and out of recognition that men of power are too easily tempted to
ignore the autonomy of those they govern?" The test would not be
37. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
38. Id. at 751.
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whether the accused made a knowing and intelligent plea, but whether
prosecutor, trial judge, and counsel provided the accused with an op-
portunity to be informed by them of what he wished to know before
deciding to accept or reject the bargain.
In safeguarding an accused citizen's right to decide his course of ac-
tion for himself, standards of conduct might substantially follow those
suggested for authorities in their negotiations to treat or to experi-
ment. Thus prosecutors would minimally be required, if they decide
to bargain, (a) to disclose to the accused and his counsel the offense
charged or to be charged, (b) to offer to disclose, and to disclose unless
the accused objects, the evidence upon which proof of the charge is
based, the range of sanctions authorized following conviction, the
rights which he is being asked to waive, the benefits he could expect
in return for the plea and which would or might not otherwise be
available to him were conviction to follow trial, (c) to honor the ac-
cused's wishes not to be informed of some or any of that which the
authorities must offer to disclose, and (d) to answer any questions
raised by the accused even if the prosecutor thought they were not
relevant to an intelligent consent to a guilty plea.39 Trial judges would
be minimally required (a) to advise the accused of his right to counsel
and that counsel will, if he wishes, be provided for negotiations with
the prosecutor, and (b) to offer to advise and to advise the accused,
unless he objects and prefers to place himself on the mercy of the
court, of what risks and benefits (if any) in terms of judicial response,
would attend the accused's acceptance or rejection of the negotiated
plea.4 0 Counsel for the accused would be minimally required (a) to
offer to explain and to explain (unless the accused objects) the possible
and likely consequences of a plea of guilty as opposed to insisting on
trial, and (b) to honor the requests of an accused including his re-
quest to "tell me what you think is best for me to do under the cir-
cumstances and I will do it."
The communications between authorities and citizen in these trans-
39. But cf. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY (App.
Draft 1968) (standards for plea bargaining). These standards place no affirmative obliga-
tions on the prosecutor. On the other hand, they acknowledge that the defendant, not his
attorney, must make the decision.
40. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Judge Bazelon's
supervisory review of trial judge Sirica's conduct), holding that a trial judge should not
participate directly in plea bargaining nor create incentives for guilty pleas by a policy
of differential sentencing; cf. Statement of Judge Hoffman (D. Md.), Oct. 10, 1973,
reprinted in J. GO.DSTEIN, A. DEtsaowi-z & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 575.
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actions must, of course, be in language comprehensible to the citizen
who is, unlike today's incarcerated mental patient, presumed to be
competent to participate in the proceedings.4t The average, reasonable
accused, competent to stand trial, is presumed not likely to understand
the substantive and procedural language of law. Thus, to protect its
own integrity and out of a paternalistic recognition of the more than
usual vulnerability of the citizen in such a setting, the law recommends,
if not requires, that the accused have access to counsel as translator
and advisor. Such persons can assist the accused to the extent he wishes
in deciding what he wants to know in order to decide for himself.
In suggesting standards of conduct for the authorities in each of the
transactions selected, I have not meant to imply that the law is un-
ambivalently committed to deferring to the dignity of all of its citi-
zens as human beings. Rather it is its ambivalence which prompts or
requires clarification of what it authorizes and does in the name of,
but often not in the service of, human autonomy. Yet in this effort
to appraise these transactions and to recommend with a single focus
the direction which supervision of the conduct of authorities should
take, I have not restored each transaction to its context as Lasswell
might require. It remains for those sufficiently provoked by these
suggestions to consider them in a full public order context and to
identify the values, goals, and functions in conflict with that which
is proposed. The hope is that they will be assisted in acknowledging
or prevented from denying the extent to which respect for human
dignity is or may be traded for the "societal good" of apprehending
more "criminals"; or the "societal gain" that might come from the
medical experiment in which "human material" is used without regard
41. But see Brief of Petitioner, Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ.
No. 194-199 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in LAW QUADRANGLE NoTES, Fall
1973, at 9 (Univ. of Michigan Law School):
There is ... one striking exception to [the) general rule [that any medical procedure
without consent is a battery]. Persons who are involuntarily committed to state
mental institutions, on a permanent commitment order, need not give consent to
medical treatment.
As'a matter of state law, there is no precedent in Michigan cases and little precedent
elsewhere... addressing whether there are any exceptions to the general rule that
committed persons may be compelled to accept any treatment imposed by the state
commitment institution.
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for the subject's wishes, or even over his objection; or, the symbolic-
even if paternalistic-value of the appearance of justice in the main-
tenance of an overburdened system of criminal law.
Just as I finished this essay, I happened upon a file card marked,
Lasswell, Analysis and Political Behavior, which I had prepared as a
graduate student in 1946 at the London School of Economics. It con-
tamined the following note: Chpt. III Legal Education and Public Policy
-p.36-"Democracy-the realization of human dignity in a common-
wealth of mutual deference."
I am pleased to acknowledge the influence of Harold Lasswell on
my work. I hope he is, too.
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